Brahms

A multiagent modeling environment for simulating social phenomena.

Maarten Sierhuis[1]
William J. Clancey[2]
Ron van Hoof[3]

1. Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science (RIACS)
2. Institute for Human-Machine Cognition (IHMC)
3. QSS Group, Inc.
NASA Ames Research Center, CA 94035-1000, USA

msierhuis@mail.arc.nasa.gov
William.J.Clancey@nasa.gov
rvanhoof@mail.arc.nasa.gov

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Introduction

In this paper we position Brahms as a tool for the social modeling and simulation research community. Brahms is a modeling and simulation environment for analyzing human work practice, and for using such models to develop intelligent software agents to support the work practice in human organizations. Brahms is the result of more than ten years of research at the Institute for Research on Learning (IRL), NYNEX Science & Technology (the former R&D institute of the Baby Bell telephone company in New York, now Verizon), and for the last five years at NASA Ames Research Center, in the Work Systems Design and Evaluation group, part of the Computational Science Division (Code IC). Brahms has been used on more than ten modeling and simulation research projects, and recently has been used as a distributed multiagent development environment for developing work practice support tools for human in-situ science exploration on planetary surfaces, in particular a human mission to Mars (Clancey et al. 2003) (Sierhuis et al. 2002) (Acquisti et al. 2002) (Sierhuis 2000).

Brahms was originally conceived of as a business process modeling and simulation tool that incorporates the *social systems of work*, by illuminating how formal process flow descriptions relate to people's actual located activities in the workplace. Our research started in the early nineties as a reaction to experiences with work process modeling and simulation (Sachs 1995). Although an effective tool for convincing management of the potential cost-savings of the newly designed work processes, the modeling and simulation environment (Sparks™ from Coopers & Lybrand) was only able to describe work as a normative workflow. However, the social systems, uncovered in work practices studied by design teams played a significant role in how work actually got done. Multi-tasking, informal assistance and circumstantial work interactions could not easily be represented in a tool with a strict workflow modeling paradigm. In response, we began to develop a tool that would have the benefits of work process modeling and simulation, but be distinctively able to represent the relations of people, locations, systems, artifacts, communication

and information content (Clancey et al. 1998). Thus, Brahms models work processes at the work practice level.

In this paper, we introduce Brahms as a multiagent modeling and simulation environment for the social simulation community. Agent architectures often do not link to theories of human behavior, or empirical data on human behavior in comparable situations. The Brahms environment is based on a number of behavioral and cognitive theories, most important situated cognition (Clancey 1997), situated action (Suchman 1987) (Lave 1988), activity theory (Leont'ev 1978) (Vygotsky 1978) and cognitive modeling (Laird et al. 1987) (Anderson and Lebiere 1998).

Brahms has been validated as a modeling and simulation tool for work practice design and analysis. Simulation models of the work practices of the Apollo astronauts on the surface of the Moon have been developed, simulated and validated with empirical Apollo mission data available from NASA, such as video analysis, voice transcripts and lunar surface procedures (Sierhuis 2001b). The Brahms modeling language is dedicated to modeling human behavior at the work practice level. This means that the Brahms language is particularly suited for modeling humans working together as individuals in organizations performing individual and teamwork activities. The Brahms language is unique in that it not only models both individual agent and group behavior, but also systems and artifact-behavior, human interaction, as well as the interaction with the environment and its influence on behavior. Most other multiagent languages leave out artifacts and the interaction with the environment, making it difficult to develop a holistic model of real-world situations, based on ethnographic observation and data collection (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). Brahms makes it easier to model empirical data gathered using ethnographical observations and data collection, because Brahms is geared towards modeling real-world activities.

We first explain what we mean by the term *work practice*, and describe our theory of modeling work practice based on existing theories of situated action, activity theory and distributed cognition. We then discuss the Brahms language in detail, specifying the different conceptual models that build up a Brahms model, providing model examples and code fragments to explain the representational capabilities and workings of Brahms. We end the paper with a discussion of the use of Brahms as a social simulation tool.

Modeling Work Practice – a theoretical view

Work practice is embodied in the way people perform their daily work activities in organizations. Our notion of work practice modeling has been developed as a reaction on the traditional views of workflow modeling in organizations. The concept of work practice originates in the research disciplines of socio-technical systems, business anthropology, and management science, focusing on both the informal and formal features of work and applying ethnography and participant observation to the analysis and design of human-machine work systems (Emery and Trist 1960) (Pava 1983) (Weisbord 1987) (Ehn 1988) (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991) (Sachs 1995) (Clancey 1999) (Clancey 2001) (Sierhuis and Clancey 2002).

We define work practice as the collective activities of a group of people who collaborate and communicate, while performing these activities synchronously or asynchronously. Very often, people view work merely as the process of transforming input to output, which is a Tayloristic view. Work practice includes how people behave in situations, at specific moments in the real world. To describe people's circumstantial behavior we need to include ecological (environmental) influences on individual activity (not only problem-solving behavior), such as collaboration, 'off-task' behaviors, multi-tasking, interrupted and resumed activities, informal interaction, use of tools,

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and movements (Clancey et al. 1998) (Sierhuis 2001b).

Our theory about modeling work practice is based on a number of elements borrowed from different existing approaches. It should be noted that Brahms models are models about real world phenomena, and thus the model is a description of the world as viewed by the modeler. Models of work practice are description of work practice and are not the same as real work practice. Winograd and Flores explain that just as we can ask how *interpretation* plays a role in understanding text, we can ask how it plays a role in understanding the world as a whole. They put forward four assumptions that, simply put, explain the way humans interpret the world (Winograd and Flores 1986). We relate this, more narrowly to the way we can interpret how people work, and we postulate the following four worldviews:

1. We are the inhabitants of a 'real world' made up of objects bearing properties. Our actions take place in the world.

This means that the way people work is constrained by the location in which this work takes place. Therefore, if we want to model work practice we need to model the real world, its locations, the people and the objects it is made up of.

2. There are 'objective facts' about that world that do not depend on the interpretation (or even presence) of any person.

This means that we cannot model a world by just modeling the individual interpretations of that world. We need to separate the different individual interpretations from the 'objective facts.' Here we get confronted with *solipsism*[1], i.e. the modeler of the 'objective facts' is also an individual in the world, and hence also interprets the facts of the world according to his or her subjectivity. However, it is important to make a distinction between modeling the interpretation of an individual in a world, and the interpretation of facts in the world. Both are subjective, but both are necessary if we want to take a holistic view of the way people work. However, we should never forget that this means that our model of work practice is *our* interpretation, and not reality.

3. Perception is a process by which facts about the world are (sometimes inaccurately) registered in our thoughts and feelings.

This seems a trivial point after having stated that every interpretation is a subjective one. However, the important issue that needs to be emphasized is that people make *inaccurate* interpretations of what they perceive, and that they will *act* according to (inaccurate) interpretations. It is therefore important to not only model the facts about the world, but also each individual's perception of those facts, since it is their perceptions that make people act independently from each other.

4. Thoughts and intentions about action can somehow cause physical (hence real-world) motion of our bodies.

This means that if we want to model work practice, we need to model physical motion of individuals. We can satisfy this assumption by simply modeling the causal relation between thoughts about action and physical motion, and we do not need to model how this happens in the human body (i.e. the neurophysiology)[2].

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[1] The theory or view that the self is the only reality (American Heritage Dictionary).

[2] We are currently working with Digitalspace, Inc. on a 3-D virtual reality integration with Adobe's Atmosphere. The BrahmsVE will allow representing agents with three-dimensional bodies in a virtual world, thus dealing with the world as a three-dimensional space.

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These four worldviews are our starting point for describing work practice as a knowledge-level concept. The *context* in which people perform real world activities is an important aspect that we describe next.

Understanding context

A broad range of work in psychology and anthropology has shown that to fully understand how people work we need to study context in order to understand the relation between individuals, artifacts and social groups. We describe three approaches in the study of context—situated action models, activity theory and distributed cognition—that have been fundamental in the development of our theory for modeling work practice. All these approaches use the notion of *activity* as the central point in the way they analyze the context in looking at human behavior.

Situated action models

Situated action models emphasize the emergence of activities within the situation. The focus is therefore on *situated action* or what we call *practice* as opposed to problem solving, which means that it is an inquiry into the everyday activity of people acting in a particular setting. The analysis of situated action is a moment-by-moment analysis of the interaction between people, and between people and the artifacts used in a particular situation (Suchman 1987). Lave identifies the basic unit of analysis for situated action as the activity of people as it relates to the setting in which this activity takes place and is constructed at the same time; 'The setting is both generated out of [the] activity and at the same time generates the activity' (Lave et al. 1984). A *setting* is the relation between acting people and the arena in which they act, almost like a theatrical play. The *arena* is the physical place, i.e. the geographical space, as well as the institution with its social, political and economical background, like the stage within the theatre (Lave and Wenger 1991).

An important aspect of the focus on the activity of people acting within an arena is that it forces the analyst to pay attention to the flux of the ongoing activity, the minute-by-minute understanding of a real activity in a real setting (Nardi 1996). One of the interesting notions coming out of situated action studies, put forward by Suchman, is that plans are not the mechanism to action, but that plans are resources for action; a 'retrospective reconstruction' of situated action. In that sense, we postulate that goals are generated within the activity, as an individual's rationalization of what the intention of the activity is; they are not necessarily the conditions of when activities are to take place (Clancey 2002).

Activity theory

Activity theory goes back to the 1920s and the developmental psychology work done in the former Soviet Union. The main developers of activity theory are Vygotsky and Leont'ev (Vygotsky 1978) (Leont'ev 1978). In activity theory the unit of analysis is an activity. An *activity* is composed of a subject, the object, its actions and operations. A *subject* is the person or group of persons that is engaged in the activity, which makes the analysis of activities focus our attention on one or more people.

An *object* is the objective of the activity as it is held by the subject(s) and motivates them in the engagement. *Actions* are processes that must be undertaken to fulfill the object. Subjects are conscious about the actions to take to accomplish the object of an activity. The notion of an activity can span multiple actors being engaged together in coordinated actions. The actors engaged together might actually have different, even conflicting objects (Kuutti 1996). This is an important

concept for the understanding teamwork and of what collaboration between individuals is about (Sierhuis et al. 2003a).

Operations are routinized and unconscious actions. For example, when learning to drive a car with a standard gear, the shifting of the gear is at first a conscious action with an explicit goal. Later on, when we are well versed in driving with a stick shift, shifting gears becomes operational and is not a specific goal-driven process anymore. The difference of actions and operations reminds us strongly of the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1983). The important take away point from this is that it seems that activities are decomposed into actions, when the activity is not yet 'automatic,' while an activity that is already operationalized is not decomposed into lower-level actions, but can be seen as a primitive action. Another key notion in activity theory is the notion of *mediation* by artifacts (Kuutti 1996). Artifacts include instruments, machines, etc, that mediate activity and are created or used by people to control their behavior.

In all these above described approaches an activity constitutes the context itself. An activity creates a context through its enactment of actions and operations of the people engaged in the activity, and using artifacts to control their engagement. As such, we can see practice as the engagement in activities over a period of time.

Distributed cognition

Distributed cognition is a branch of cognitive science that studies the representation of knowledge both inside the heads of the people, as well as within the artifacts and systems they use. The cognitive system can be seen as an activity in activity theory. For example, Hutchins, in his study of the activity of 'flying a plane,' describes the cognitive system as the total setting of the cockpit (Hutchins 1995). He takes the *cockpit system* as the unit of analysis and observes the many representations that are inside the cockpit system, yet outside the head of the pilots. By taking this social-technical systems approach he can describe the 'cognitive' properties of the system, meaning giving an account of the system's behavioral properties in terms of its internal representations, without saying anything about the processes that operated inside the heads of the individuals within the system. Thus, distributed cognition moves the unit of analysis to the system as a whole, and analyzes the functioning of the system as a 'functional unit,' instead of as a cognitive system. In doing this, the emphasis is on understanding the coordination among the individuals and the artifacts in the system. However, this understanding is created by focusing on the available information in the system, as represented in the artifacts and the heads of the individual. There is less of a focus on the activity and situated-actions by the people in the system as a whole, but more on how the lack of information creates a breakdown in the execution of plans and tasks by the individuals in the system.

One of the limitations of this approach is the necessity of drawing a boundary on the system to be analyzed at the start of an analysis, as opposed to letting the analysis of the setting be the driver in setting the boundary of the system. For example, Hutchins, in his study of the cockpit system, does not take into account the interaction and coordination between the pilots in the cockpit and the other crew and the passengers in the airplane. Neither does he consider the interaction with the control tower and their view of the cockpit system. However, the interesting part of distributed cognitive analysis for getting an understanding of the work practice of pilots is the focus on the 'memory' of the system as driving the activities of the pilots. This emphasizes the importance of a total systems view as part of the context in the understanding of practical knowledge.

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Our notion of activities

The key construct in the Brahms language is an *activity* and is easily confused with the traditional notion of a *task*—a representational construct that describes human behavior in terms of problem-solving with goals and operators (cf. (Clancey 1992)). Some argue that there is no distinction between tasks and activities and thus all human behavior can be simulated using a problem-solving framework (e.g. Soar, (Newell 1990) and ACT-R, (Anderson and Lebiere 1998)). Here, we will try to explain the difference, and will show that representing human activity at the work practice level is a different paradigm for representing human behavior then the paradigm of representing all human behavior as problem-solving behavior. For a more detailed discussion on this, see (Clancey 2002).

The theory of humans as an information processing systems (IPS, (Newell 1990)) defines problem solving in terms of pursuing pre-specified *goals* in order to accomplish pieces of work that need to be done (i.e. *tasks*). The specification of a goal is a way to make a stated problem actionable, i.e. solvable by means of well-defined decisions. Problem solving is the systematic search over the problem space describing how one can attain a goal. Such an approach is in contrast to a theory for describing *how people actually work* within the constraints of their environment, and how the environment determines their actions and the interactions with other people and artifacts in that environment. Describing the behavior in terms of what actually happens in the world does not lead to a description of the individual's problem-solving behavior. Rather, it leads to a description of the emergent *total system behavior* in terms of the individual interactions, responses to the other elements in the system (people and artifacts), as well as the emergent sequence of individual *activity* (i.e. the state of being active), something Newell calls 'microepics.'

The focus in modeling work practice is on the IPS being the *total system*, including the environment, people, artifacts, places, and time. The emphasis of behavior lays at a broader level, namely at a level of *interaction between* discrete entities in the system, each being an IPS in its own right, but influenced by the other elements (IPS's) in the system. Problem solving happens at the individual level, while conceptual construction of activities (i.e. the practice) happens at the system level. By describing the individual activity and interactions of elements in the system we can understand the behavior of the total system. In this view of system behavior, *activities* are socially constructed engagements situated in the real world, taking time, effort and application of knowledge. Activities have a well-defined beginning and end, but do not have goals in the sense of problem-solving models. Not every activity is a problem-solving activity, but in some activities a problem-solving task might be performed. Viewing work as activities of individuals allows us to understand why a person is working on a particular task at a particular time, why certain tools are being used or not, and why others are participating or not.


Figure 1. Dimensions of behavior

In a sense, as is shown in Figure 1, activities are orthogonal to tasks and goals. While engaged

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in an activity, people might articulate the task that they are working on, and the goal that they want to accomplish, but these are constructed within the activity. An example of an activity is *being on an extra-vehicular activity (EVA) on Mars*. A goal within this activity might be to *get to a location on the Martian surface*. A task to reach that goal might be to *plan a route to get from the current location to the end location*. The task and goal are created within the activity, but they are not necessarily determined by the activity, meaning that they could similarly arise outside of that particular activity in another (e.g. during the EVA planning meeting the evening before the EVA). Conceptually we can view activities as the 'what we are doing at each moment in time'. Goals can be viewed as the 'why we are doing what we are doing,' while tasks can be viewed as the 'how we are doing what we are doing.'

To understand activities we must first understand that human action is inherently social. The key is that action is meant in the broad sense of an activity, and not in the narrow sense of altering the state of the world. Instead of viewing 'social activity' as something that people do together, such as socializing at a party or the social chat before the meeting, we take a social behaviorist's view. Describing human activities as social means that the tools and materials we use, and how we conceive of what we are doing, are culturally constructed. Although an individual may be alone, as when reading a book, there is always some larger social activity in which he or she is engaged. For instance, the individual is reading the book in his hotel, as relaxation, while on a business trip. Engaging in the activity of 'being on a business trip,' there is an even larger social activity that is being engaged in, namely 'working for the company,' and so on. The point is that we are always engaged in a social activity, which is to say that our activity, as human beings, is always shaped, constrained, and given meaning by our ongoing interactions within a business, family, and community. An activity is therefore not just something we do, but a manner of interacting. Viewing activities as a *form of engagement* emphasizes that the conception of activity constitutes a means of coordinating action, a means of deciding what task to do next, what goal to pursue, in other words, a manner of being engaged with other people and things in the environment. The idea of activity has been appropriately characterized in cognitive science as intentional, a mode of being. The social perspective adds the emphasis of time, rhythm, place, and a well-defined beginning and end. In Brahms an activity is defined as a collection of sub-activities or actions performed by an individual, socially constructed, situated in the physical world, taking time, effort, and application of knowledge. An activity has a well-defined beginning and end, but can be interrupted and resumed

The next section describes the Brahms language and explains what is meant with concepts multiagent, rule-based and activity.

The Brahms Language

We will explain the modeling concepts of the language. For a more detailed description of the language see Sierhuis (Sierhuis 2001b) and van Hoof & Sierhuis (van Hoof and Sierhuis 2000). The Brahms language is necessarily an agent and object-based language in which people are represented as intentional agents and artifacts in the world as objects (with or without behavior), positioned in a model of places. Agents in Brahms are belief-desire-intention-like (BDI-like) agents, with beliefs representing the desires of the agents and workframes and thoughtframes representing their intentions to perform certain activities (Cohen and Levesque 1990) (Rao and Georgeff 1991). The work practice of a person is represented as a combination of activities that can be performed by an agent representing the person, *workframes* constraining when the agent can

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perform the activities, *beliefs* the agent acquires by means of reasoning (e.g. problem-solving), perception of *facts* in the world depending on *location* and current activity, and *communication* with other agents and objects.

The Brahms language was first of all designed to help researchers develop simulations of human and machine behavior. However, the current version of Brahms also supports the development of multiagent software systems that are based on models of human activity behavior. To enable the modeling of human activity behavior, the Brahms language embodies assumptions about how to describe social situations, workplaces and work practice. Thus, Brahms is an agent language that operationalizes a theory for modeling work practice, allowing the researcher to develop models of human activity behavior that corresponds with how people actual behave in the real world. This is in contrast to an agent-language such as Swarm (Minar et al. 1996), an often-used language for modeling and simulating social and economic behavior of large agent societies (Luna and Perrone 2002). Swarm is not based on any particular theory of modeling human behavior and is not an agent modeling language in the strict sense of the word, but rather an addition in the form of object libraries for Objective-C (an object-oriented programming language) (Terna 1998). Swarm agents are not intentional, but are simple objects with behavior represented as inherited imperative methods that can be triggered by a higher-level schedule object in the model. In contrast, Brahms is a pure agent language where agent actions are not scheduled by an overall scheduler, but by each agent having its own inference engine scheduling and executing the agent's activities based on its current belief-set.

An Example Model: Simulating a Robotic Mission to the Moon

Sending robots to the Moon or to Mars is a difficult task, one that mission designers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, CA spent years to design and implement. Understanding how scientists and engineers will work together during a mission, and also how people will communicate with the robot on the planetary surface is a research topic in order to design better mission operations for future missions (Sierhuis et al. 2003b) (Sierhuis et al. 2003a). We use our work in modeling mission operations for robotic missions to the Moon and Mars as our example to explain the Brahms language and its representation capabilities. The Victoria model is a Brahms model of the mission operations for the Victoria mission proposal. The Victoria mission was a proposed robotic mission to the Moon. The model simulates the mission operations concept for the mission in such detail that the model allows for the understanding of the relationship between mission and science support on the ground and the efficiency of the robot in exploring the lunar surface for water ice (Sierhuis 2001a) (Sierhuis et al. 2003b).

Model Skeleton

A Brahms model consists of several model files. Brahms model files are ascii-files ending in a .b extension and consisting of legal Brahms syntax. Good modeling practice is to create a separate source file for each Brahms model element, such as groups and agents, and classes and objects, although one can write a Brahms model completely in one source code file if one so pleases. A common approach is to create one main model file that imports all other model files. Since Brahms does not have an initialization function, such as the 'main' function in the C program language (Kernighan and Ritchie 1988), the main model file simply contains import statements for the agents and objects in the model. Excerpt 1 shows the main model file for the Victoria mission operations model.

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Excerpt 1. Model File

```
package Victoria;

import MyBase.*;
import *;
```

The package statement defines that the model exists as a package called Victoria. A package is a directory file structure allowing the modeler to compartmentalize the model into appropriate sub-directories. The import statement loads in the needed model files. Excerpt 1 shows that the model is loading all .b files in the MyBase sub-directory of the Victoria package, as well as all the .b files in the Victoria package's root directory. To start a simulation a compiled version of this file is the model file that is first loaded into the Brahms virtual machine (BVM). The Brahms compiler compiles each .b file separately into a Brahms 'byte-code' file. The 'byte-code' language for Brahms is a XML data definition language, making each compiled Brahms model file a Brahms XML file that can be loaded in and executed by the BVM.

The Agent Model

When developing a Brahms model we first design an agent model. The agent model is purely a conceptual modeling construct and is not a language construct within the Brahms language. The Brahms modeling approach is based on a model-based method that divides any system to be modeled into a number of more or less independent sub-models, the Agent, Object, Geography, Knowledge, Activity and Communication model. The Brahms model development environment—the Composer—supports this model-based approach, and allows the modeler to create groups and agents using a graphical user interface.

Group hierarchy

The agent model consists of a group hierarchy representing the social, organizational or functional groups of which agents are members. In the mission operations domain we can represent the mission operation workers according to their functional roles, such as the science team. Members of the science team are responsible for the science deliverables of the mission. They are often world-class scientists in specific domains, such as specialized science instruments that are carried onboard the robot. The science team members are divided into science theme groups that represent the functional roles during the mission, such as the 'instrument synergy team,' the 'science operations team' and the 'data analysis and interpretation team'. Excerpt 2 shows the definition of some of the groups in Brahms source code (the excerpt shows partial source code; '…' means that source code is left out):

Excerpt 2. Partial Agent Model

```
group MyBasegroup memberof BaseGroup {
    attributes:
            public symbol groupMembership;
}

group VictoriaTeam memberof BaseGroup {…}

group ScienceTeam memberof VictoriaTeam, MyBaseGroup {
    location: Building244;
```

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```
                …
        initial_beliefs:
        // everyone knows where the rover is at the start of the sim
                (VictoriaRover.location = ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1);

        activities:
                …
        workframes:
                …
        thoughtframes:
}

group ScienceOperationsTeam memberof ScienceTeam {…}
}

agent Agent1 memberof ScienceOperationsTeam {
    initial_beliefs:
            (current.groupMembership = ScienceOperationsTeam);

    intial_facts:
            (current.groupMembership = ScienceOperationsTeam);

}
```

We will go step-by-step through the source code of Excerpt 2 explaining how groups and agents are defined. Note that this excerpt describes the definition of three groups and one agent. The bold characters show Brahms language keywords. Every Brahms language element definition is actually placed in a separate source file, but is here shown as if it is part of one source code file.

The first two groups are *MyBaseGroup* and *VictoriaTeam*. *MyBaseGroup* is a group defined by the modeler and is used to define common features for all groups. It is a non-domain specific 'root' of the group hierarchy, used by the modeler to define common group properties. *MyBaseGroup* and *VictoriaTeam* are both members of the group *BaseGroup*, which is the root of all groups and is part of a base library that comes with the Brahms language, with certain predefined standard attributes. Here the *MyBaseGroup* group defines a common attribute for all groups, i.e. the *groupMembership attribute*. The *groupMembership* attribute is used in the model to allow agents to know to what group they belong. The second group that is defined is *ScienceTeam*. The group *ScienceTeam* is a member of two parent groups, *VictoriaTeam* and *MyBase*. This example shows that Brahms supports multiple inheritance for groups and agents. Group inheritance means that the subgroups and/or agents inherit all the elements defined in the parent group. The Brahms compiler will recognize naming conflicts in multiple inheritance and will report these at compile time. At this moment Brahms does not support 'late-binding' and thus there are no possible inheritance conflicts at run-time. Next, the group *ScienceOperationsTeam* is defined as a member of the *ScienceTeam* group. Last, but not least, is the definition of an actual agent. The keyword *agent* declares agents, and in this example *Agent1* is an agent that is a member of the *ScienceOperationsTeam* group. Thus, the definition of groups and agents in Excerpt 2 explicitly defines the group hierarchy in Figure 2

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Figure 2. Group Hierarchy from Excerpt 2

Agent beliefs

Intentional agents are entities whose behavior can be predicted by the method of attributing belief, desire and acumen (Dennett 1987). This philosophical stance has resulted in representing intentionality as a logical framework in which agents have beliefs and there is a deduction model for beliefs (Konolige 1986). Brahms agents are intentional and represent this intentionality as the set of beliefs at time t and the set of rules (workframes and thoughtframe) that can be used to act in the world and deduce new beliefs. Beliefs are represented as first-order logic propositions. An agent's belief-set changes over time based on actions in the world, communication with other agents, world fact detection and reasoning. As the belief-set of an agent changes, the behavior of the agent can change. In other words, there is a logical relationship between an agent's intention and its action in the world.

An agent's beliefs are object- or agent-attribute-value triplets (OAV). The modeler can specify initial beliefs for an agent. Initial beliefs are beliefs that the agent receives at initialization. Initial beliefs specify the initial belief-set of an agent in the model and are a way to define initial scenarios for a simulation run. Excerpt 2 shows that *Agent1* will have two beliefs in its initial belief-set. The first is an initial-belief that is declared at the agent-level (i.e. in *Agent1*). The standard form of beliefs is *(AgentOrObject.attributename = value)*. The initial belief in *Agent1* states that the agent belongs to the group *ScienceOperationsTeam* (the keyword *current* represents the agent itself, and is bound at run-time for each agent). The second belief of *Agent1* is inherited from the *ScienceTeam* group. Excerpt 2 shows an initial-belief declared in the *ScienceTeam* group. This belief states that the *VictoriaRover* agent is located at the *shadow-edge of crater SN1*.

Beliefs are represented as values for attributes of agents or objects. Brahms is a strongly-typed language, which means that every attribute value or parameter is type-checked during compile- and runtime. In order for an agent to get a specific belief, the attribute and its type needs to have been defined. In Excerpt 2 the declaration of the *groupMemberShip* attribute is shown in the *MyBaseGroup* group as an attribute of type *symbol*. *Agent1* inherits this attribute and thus any agent can have a belief about the group membership of *Agent1* (not only those that inherit this attribute). The initial-belief in *Agent1* declares this belief for *Agent1*, but other agents can have this belief as well (this is not shown in Excerpt 2). Since beliefs are OAVs, another agent can have a different belief about *Agent1*'s group membership, e.g. agent *Agent2* can belief that *Agent1* is a member of the *InstrumentEnergyTeam*. Thus, it is possible that different agents have either similar or different beliefs about aspects of the world, allowing similar type agents to have a different belief-set and thus behave differently (see section on Activity Model).

World facts

If agents can have different beliefs about similar attributes of agents or objects, how can we represent the actual state of the environment in which agents are located? Brahms operationalizes the previous stated second world-view from Winograd and Flores by representing 'objective facts' about the world as *facts* in the simulated environment, similarly as beliefs. In some sense we can see the environment as an implicit object (the World object) with a fact-set. Agents and objects can create facts in the world similar either by acting in the world (see section about agent behavior) or as initial-facts, similar as initial-beliefs. Excerpt 2 shows that at initialization *Agent1* creates a similar fact about its group membership. The meaning of the declaration of the same initial-belief and initial-fact is that not only does *Agent1* belief it is a member of the *ScienceTeam* group, it is also *true* in the simulated world. Where beliefs are local to an agent, facts are not, and thus we could have also represented that the fact is that the agent is a member of the science team, but the agent is simply not aware of that fact (i.e. it does not have the belief). Thus, facts in the model represent the objective truth about the state of the simulated world.

The Object Model

Similar to the Agent Model, the object model defines the objects in the world. There are two types of objects, physical artifacts—plainly called *objects*—with or without behavior, and concepts represented as *conceptual objects* with attributes. Using these two distinct object types we can both represent the behavior of physical objects in the world (e.g. computer, spacecraft, science instruments, etc) or a concept—a non-physical entity—of which an agent can have beliefs. *Objects* can have beliefs and create facts, similarly as agents. However, *conceptual objects* cannot. Objects and conceptual objects can be part of an class inheritance hierarchy, similar to other object-oriented programming languages (see Figure 3)


Figure 3. Class Hierarchy

The Knowledge Model

The knowledge model consists of production rules for agents and objects. Production rules in Brahms are forward chaining inference rules associated with groups and agents, acting on the beliefs of an agent. These rules are called *thoughtfames*, because using these rules an agent can 'think' and deduce new beliefs. Thoughtframes can be declared in groups, agents, classes and objects. Each agent and object has a set of thoughtframes, a combination of thoughtframes locally declared and inherited. The *ScienceTeam* group from Excerpt 2 shows the position of a thoughtframe section underneath which all the group's thoughtframes need to be declared. Here, Excerpt 3 shows the declaration of the *CalculateEnergyLevel* thoughtframe in the *Rover* group.

Excerpt 3. Partial Knowledge Model for Rover group

```
group Rover memberof MyBaseGroup {
    …
```

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```
thoughtframe CalculateEnergyLevel {
    repeat: true;
    variables:
            forone(double) energyused;

    when (knownval(current.energyUsedInActivity = energyused) and
          knownval(current.consumedEnergy = true))
    do {
            conclude((current.energyUsed = current.energyUsed + energyused));
            conclude((current.energyLevel = current.energyLevel – energyused);
            conclude((current.energyLeftToUse = current.energyLeftToUse –
                                                energyused));
            conclude((VictoriaRover.consumedEnergy = false));
    } //end do
} //end thoughtframe
    …
} //end group
```

A thoughtframe (tfr) consists of a number of elements which we will describe using Excerpt 3. First of all, a tfr is used to infer new beliefs based on current beliefs in the belief-set of the agent. New beliefs are created when a thoughtframe executes. The *conclude* statement in the do-part or body of the tfr creates a new belief for the agent. Excerpt 3 shows four such *conclude* statements, each of the form *(O.A = v)*, where *O = 'current'*, *A = [an attribute of the Rover group]* and *v* is the outcome of a numerical expression that is evaluated before the belief is created.

The numerical expression *v* is evaluated as follows; *v* ::= Operand-1 Operator Operand-2. In all four conclude statements in Excerpt 3, Operand-1 is of the form O.A, where O = 'current' and A = [an attribute of the Rover group]. Operand-2 is not of the same form as Operand-1. In this case, Operand-2 is the name of a variable of type double declared in the tfr (i.e. energyused). Because of the forward chaining inference mechanism, the value of this variable had to be bound in the precondition before the tfr can 'fire'. The precondition is the when-part of the tfr in Excerpt 3. To explain how the variable gets its value, we need to explain how the precondition of a tfr is matched.

Let us investigate the matching of the first precondition from Excerpt 3, *knownval(current.energyUsedInActivity = energyused)*. The *knownval* keyword means that the agent's inference engine needs to find a belief in the belief-set of the agent of the form given in between the round brackets. The inference engine will pattern-match on the lhs of the belief-pattern. First, the value of the variable *current* is bound to the current agent for which the tfr is being executed (e.g. *Rover-1*). The pattern-matching algorithm finds *all* beliefs that match the lhs (e.g. *Rover-1.energyUsedInActivity*), potentially returning a list of beliefs matching this pattern. Next, the rhs of the precondition is evaluated and the result matched against the list of beliefs returned by this initial pattern matching. In this case the evaluation is simple, because the rhs consists solely of a *forone* variable declared in the tfr. A *forone* variable means that it can have one and only one value (there are also *foreach* and *collectall* type variables, which are not explained further). The result of this is that the second step in the pattern-matching process returns the rhs-value of the first belief in the previously matched set of beliefs. If this previously matched set is empty the *knownval* function returns *false*, and the precondition fails and the tfr is thus not 'fired'. However, in case there is a matching belief *true* is returned and as a side effect of the pattern matching the variable *energyused* is now bound to the rhs-value of the matched belief. The variable stays bound to this value for the duration of the tfr execution, and can thus be used in subsequent tfr statements, such as in the *conclude* statements.

Every precondition in the when-part of the tfr is evaluated, as long as the previous precondition returns true. If one of the preconditions evaluates to false the tfr is abandoned, and the do-part is not executed. Thus, in conclusion, when the agent has one or more beliefs that are matching all the preconditions, the tfr is immediately executed. Using this approach we can represent the forward-reasoning behavior of an agent; the *conclude* statement in one tfr can trigger the execution of a subsequent tfr, thus creating a 'forward chaining' of belief-set changes simulating the reasoning behavior of a person. Every time the agent gets a new belief, only those tfrs are evaluated that have a precondition that is a potential match on the newly created belief. This makes the reasoning behavior efficient, because at every belief change event in an agent only a small number of preconditions have to be evaluated.

The Activity Model

The activity model consists of the possible activity behavior for an agent. This is the heart of a Brahms model, because modeling work practice is about the representation of people's activity behavior over time, and performing these activities based on their beliefs. The activity model consists of two elements, *activities* and *workframes*. We explain these two important Brahms concepts using the source code in Excerpt 4 as the example. The activitiy and workframe from Excerpt 4 is from the *ScienceOperationsTeam* group. The source code specifies a group member's behavior during the rover activity of 'finding water-ice in a specific crater on the Moon.' As mentioned before, there are two parts to the encoding of such behavior. First, we need to encode what a science operations team member does (i.e. what activities he or she is engaged in) while the rover is in the activity of finding water-ice in a crater. Secondly, we need to specify when this is done. In the Brahms language the first part is encoded in a *composite-activity*, while the second part is encoded in a *workframe*; a similar production rule-like construct as a *thoughtframe*.

Workframes

In Excerpt 4, there are two workframes shown: a 'high-level' workframe called *wf_SearchForWaterIce*, and a workframe part of the *FindingWaterIce* activity called *wf_WaitingForData*. Workframes work similar as thoughtframes, but the important difference is that workframes allow for the execution of activities. While thoughtframes represent an agent's reasoning, a workframe represents an agent's activity execution *constraint*. Since activities take time, a major difference between a workframe and a thoughtframe is that a thoughtframe does not take any simulation time, while a workframe has a duration based on the time that the activity takes (see explanation of activities bellow). Workframes 'fire' according to the same pattern-matching process explained for thoughtframes. Thus, workframe preconditions are tested in the same way as thoughtframe preconditions and workframe variables are bound in the same way. The body of a workframe (i.e. the do-part) can have *conclude* statements, similar to thoughtframes, however the body of workframes can also contain *activity* calls. *Conclude* statements in workframes are meant to represent the belief-state of the agent in relation to the activity that is going to be executed (i.e. before the activity call) or has finished executing (i.e. after the activity call), and are not meant to represent reasoning of the agent (for this we use thoughtframes).

Excerpt 4. Partial Activity Model for the ScienceOperationTeam group

```
composite_activity FindingWaterIce (Crater crater, int pri) {
    priority: pri;
```

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```
              primitive_activity WaitingForData( ) {
                      priority: 0;
                      max_duration: 3600;
              } //end activity
              …
      workframes:
              workframe wf_WaitingForData {
                      repeat:true;
                      priority: 0;
                      detectables:
                              detectable ReceiveHydrogenData {
                               detect((VictoriaRover.nextSubActivity = DoDrilling))
                               then abort;
                              } //end detectable
                              …
                      when (knownval(current.nextSubActivity = WaitForData))
                      do {
                              WaitingForData( );
                      } //end do
              } //end workframe
              …
      thoughtframes:
              …
} //end composite_activity

workframe wf_SearchForWaterIce {
    repeat: false;
    variables:
            foreach(Crater) rover-loc

    when (knownval(VictoriaRover.currentActivity = SearchForWaterIce) and
          knownval(VictoriaRover.location = rover-loc))
    do {
            conclude((current.currentActivity = SearchForWaterIce));
            FindingWaterIce(rover-loc, 0);
    } //end do
} //end workframe
```

One way of thinking about the role of workframes is to view them as constraints on when an agent can perform an activity. Workframe (wfr) *wf_SearchForWaterIce* constrains when the agent can perform the *FindingWaterIce* activity. The constraints are represented as the preconditions of the workframe. The preconditions encode what beliefs the agent needs to have in its belief-set to enable it to perform the activity or activities (there can be more than one activity call in the workframe body). In plain English *wf_SearchForWaterIce* says: 'When I believe that the *VictoriaRover* is currently in the activity *SearchForWaterIce* and I believe that the *VictoriaRover* is currently located in any crater, first bind the name of the crater to the variable *rover-loc*, then execute the workframe body with priority zero' (Brahms allows for parallel execution of worframes, but uses a 'time-sharing' approach using priorities, see explanation bellow). Note also that *wf_SearchForWaterIce* has the *repeat = false* statement at the top. This means that this workframe will only fire once for a particular set of beliefs that match all its preconditions (a wfi-context). The result is that the agent will only execute *wf_SearchForWaterIce* once for any crater the *VictoriaRover* visits.

When the agent's inference engine has determined that the preconditions of *wf_SearchForWaterIce* are satisfied (due to finding matching beliefs in the agent's belief-set) and it is the wfr with the highest priority, the agent will start executing the first statement in the body of

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the wfr, which in this case is the *conclude* statement that creates the belief for the agent that says that it its current activity is *SearchForWaterIce*. This represents that the agent knows that he is currently in the activity of searching for water ice. Next, the engine calls the activity *FindingWaterIce*. We will explain next how this works. It should first be said that what has been explained, i.e. from matching of beliefs to the preconditions, to binding the variable and firing the workframe, executing the *conclude* statement and calling the activity *SearchForWaterIce*, is all done in the same simulation time-event. Thus, although these processes take actual CPU time, they don't take any simulation time for the agent.

Activities

Activities are the most important construct in the Brahms language. All agent behavior has to be modeled as an activity. There are three different types: primitive, composite and Java activities. All activities have a user-defined name representing a behavior defined by the modeler. According to our theory of modeling work practice, the name of an activity should be the name of an observed behavior of a person in the real-world that the agent represents, but there is no rule in Brahms that states that the agent has to represent a person and that this has to be a person in the real world. It is the responsibility of the modeler to decide the relevance of the model to the system behavior that is being modeled. This allows the use of the Brahms language in any domain and for any purpose, including, but not restricted to, modeling social phenomena, human behavior, and software agent behavior. In Excerpt 4, the name of the activity that is called in wfr *wf_SearchForWaterIce* is *SearchForWaterIce*. It represents what the agent—a member of the science team—is doing while the rover is searching for water ice in a crater on the Moon.

Activities can have parameters that are passed as bounded variables into the activity when it is called in a worframe. In wfr *wf_SearchForWaterIce* the parameter-values that are passed are the value of the *rover-loc* variable, bound in the precondition as the *crater* in which the rover is searching for water ice, and an activity *priority* value of zero.

The activity *SearchForWaterIce* called in the wfr *wf_SearchForWaterIce* is declared at the top of Excerpt 4. This activity is of type *composite_activity*. Composite activities are activities that are *decomposed* into lower-level subactivities, workframes and thoughtframes. Excerpt 4 shows only a partial implementation of the *SearchForWaterIce* activity. It shows the declaration of one subactivity called *WaitingForData*, and one workframe called *wf_WaitingForData*. Activity *WaitingForData* is a *primitive_activity* type. A primitive activity is an activity that is not further decomposed. It can be used to represent an *operation* (as in activity theory) or an *action* in the world that is not further decomposed. Primitive activities have a specified maximum or a random duration. This is different from a *composite_activity* in that it has a pre-specified duration. In contrast, the duration of a composite activity depends on the duration of the subactivities executed within it (note that thoughtframes have no duration).

Primitive activity duration is determined at the start of its execution—either randomly chosen between a given min-max duration interval, or given as a max duration—but is not necessarily the actual duration of the activity. The actual duration of an activity depends on the state of the workframe instance[3] (wfi) in which the activity is being called. Each wfi is in one of the states

---

[3] When a workframe (or thoughtframe) is fired (i.e. the preconditions are matched against beliefs in the agent's belief-set) a workframe instance is created for every workframe variable context that matches all preconditions. Each workframe instance is now an independent version of the workframe and will be exectured independently from each other, with different variable bindings (determined by the wfi-context).

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shown in Figure 4. The state of an agent's activity behavior is defined by the combined sets of available, working, interrupted, and interrupted-with-impasse wfis at any moment in time.


Figure 4. State transition diagram for workframe instances

There can only be one *current* activity for an agent. The time an activity has been active can only change when the activity is the current activity. Therefore, when an activity is in the *non-active* state its active time is *not* increasing, although simulation time is always increasing. Which activity is the current activity depends on which wfi is in the *working* state and the execution of the wfi-body.

There are different ways a wfi can change state. One way is through the use of priorities. Every time a workframe fires the created wfis receive a priority, based on the prioriy of the workframe, if given, or the highest priority of the activities called within the workframe body. The default priority is always zero. The agent's inference engine determines which of the *available* and *working* and *interrupted* wfis have the highest priority. This one is moved to the *working* state. Every time a new wfi becomes available, there exist the potential that the *working* wfi is interrupted by a higher-priority wfi. In that case the current working instance is moved to the *interrupted* state, and the new instance with the highest priorities is moved to the *working* state, and thus becomes the current wfi the agent is executing.

There are other ways for an activity to change from a *working state*. The state change described above is based on other 'independent' workframes firing. However, a wfi can change its own state. The default way for a wfi to change its *working* state is when the body is finished executing. At that moment the wfi automatically moves from the *working* state to the *done* state and there it gets deleted. However, there are other state-changing events that can be represented inside a workframe. This is done using a *detectable*. Excerpt 4 shows the declaration of the *ReceiveHydrogenData* detectable. A detectable defines that if the agent detects a *fact* in the world this fact becomes a belief of the agent. The belief is then matched to the *detect* condition in the detectable. If the agent has a belief that matches the condition the body of the detectable is executed. The body of a detectable can contain one specific action: *abort, complete, impasse* or *continue*. The *ReceiveHydrogenData* detectable specifies an *abort* action. The detectable says that if the agent gets a belief (either through the detection of a fact in the world, or through other means) that the *VictoriaRover*'s next subactivity is to drill in the lunar surface, it will abort the *working* workframe,

which means it will end the activity *WaitingForData*.

The actual behavior of the agent is thus dependent on which of its workframes fire, and when. Firing of workframes depends on the beliefs of the agent at every moment in time. The beliefs in the belief-set of the agent depend on the initial-beliefs, conclude statements in thoughtframes and workframes that fire, communication with other agents (see the section about the communication mode), and detection of facts in the world. The behavior of the agents is therefore situation specific and it is not only dependent on its internal reasoning (using thoughtframes), but is also determined by the interaction of the agent with other agents and with the modeled environment. We refer to the Brahms modeling paradigm as a *situated activity paradigm*.

An important aspect of the Brahms activity paradigm is that activities are not the same as functions and procedures in imperative languages. Imperative languages use a program stack to keep track of sub-function calls. When a subfunction is executed, the function's context is 'popped' onto the program stack. When in a subfunction the program is not also still in the context of the 'parent' function. Thus the program cannot move execution back and forth between a function and its subfunctions that are called. Function execution is sequential and cannot be interrupted. Not so in activities. In contrast, Brahms activities stay active while they are being executed. Thus, if a subactivity in a workframe of a composite activity gets executed, the 'parent' composite activity is still active. All workframes, thoughtframes and detectables in the 'parent' activity are still being evaluated while the agent is executing the subactivity. This is part of the Brahms *subsumption* architecture (Brooks 1991), and is based on the principle that humans are always in a hierarchy of activities at the same time. For example, the science team member from Excerpt 4 is also still in the activity of finding water ice when it is in the activity of waiting for data to be returned by the rover. Thus, every workframe, thoughtframe or detectable in the current *activity hierarchy* is part of the agent's context, and can be fired at any moment, changing the belief and behavioral state of the agent.

Java Activities

A special type of activity is the *Java activity*. A Java activity is a primitive activity that is declared similar as other primitive activities, but is implemented in the Java programming language. Java activities are helpful if the agent or object needs to perform complicated calculations that can easier be done in the Java language, or if the agent needs to interact with systems outside of the Brahms language. The java activity specifies the fully qualified name of the Java class that either implements the *IExternalActivity* interface or extends the *AbstractExternalActivity* class. The interface and class are specified in the Brahms Java Application Interface (JAPI). When the java activity is executed an instance of the class is created and the Java code executed. If the class extends the *AbstractExternalActivity* class, the java code has access—using the JAPI methods available—to the parameters passed into the activity, the belief-set of the agent or object, as well as the fact-set of the world. The java activity is also able to conclude new beliefs and facts, create new agents and objects, as well as communicate with other agents and objects in the Brahms model. In other words, for any built-in activity allowed in the body of a workframe there exists a JAPI method equivalent.

Excerpt 5 gives an example of a Java activity. The *getCurrentTime* Java activity is part of the *CalendarUtil* group and class in the Brahms base library. The calendar utility implements a calendar object that allows agents to deal with the Gregorian calendar and concepts such as 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'last week', 'last month', et cetera. The implementation of this Java

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activity is located in the *brahms.base.util.GetCurrentTimeActivity* java class in the Brahms *common.jar* file, which is loaded at the start of the BVM.

Excerpt 5. Java Activity Example

```
/**
 * Creates a new Calendar object and initializes its beliefs with the
 * current date and time based on the currently set or default
 * time zone. In simulated mode the time will be initialized to
 * the simulated date/time unless the timeType is set to REAL_TIME in
 * which case the system time is returned. In (distributed) real-time
 * mode always the actual system time is used regardless of whether the
 * timeType is set to SIM_TIME (a warning will be generated in the vm.log
 * file if SIM_TIME is set when this activity is called when the virtual
 * machine is in (distributed) real-time mode.
 *
 * @param timeType one of SIM_TIME or REAL_TIME to indicate from what clock
 *  the time should be returned, the internal simulation clock or the
 *  system clock.
 * @return out an unbound variable of type Calendar to which to assign
 *  the newly created Calendar object
 */

java getCurrentTime(symbol timeType, Calendar out) {
    class: 'brahms.base.util.GetCurrentTimeActivity';
} //end java
```

Communication Model

One of the most important aspects of modeling human behavior is the interaction with other people and systems. Brahms supports representing human-human communication, as well as human-machine communication using the concept of communication as an activity. The communication model consists of a definition of communication activities between agents and objects. In Brahms, communication is defined as the *transfer of beliefs* between agents and/or objects. Just as in human communication, communicating takes time and is situated in an activity. In order to model human communication we thus have to represent the time it takes to communicate, either between people, systems, or between people and systems. To do this here is a special type of *primitive* activity called a *communication activity.* An agent or object can perform a communication activity like any other primitive activity. However, a communication activity has a 'side effect', namely that when the agent (or object) performs the activity it can *send* (i.e. tell) beliefs to the agents (or objects) it is communicating with, or it can *receive* (i.e. ask) beliefs from an agent (or object). There is an obvious catch; an agent (or object) can only communicate beliefs that it has in its belief-set. In other words, agents and objects cannot communicate that what it has no beliefs about.

Modeling work practice of people means that we are interested in modeling how communication actually happens in the real world. Therefore, in Brahms we are able to model communication not as a simple sending or receiving of beliefs between agents or objects, but we represent the complete communication path of the communication. If we model an organization of communicating people we might want to represent the communication tools that are used, e.g. the use of e-mail, telephones or faxes. We have gone as far as modeling the operation of the telephone system with voice mail capability. This way we are able to model the fact that communication of information in practice often takes more time then the (abstracted) transfer of beliefs between

sender and receiver. If a person calls another person who is not available at that moment, the caller might (or might not) leave a voice mail. It will depend on the receiver's activity of listening to his or her voice mail for the content of the message to actually be transferred. To model this, we model the telephones (as objects) and their voice mail capability, the location of telephones (see section on the geography model), as well as the agents' activities of calling someone via the telephone, the telephone object transferring the communicated beliefs to the receiver's voice mail (in case the receiver is not answering the phone), and the receiver's activity of listening to its voice mail and responding back to the caller if necessary. Obviously, it is not necessary to model communication paths in that much detail if this is not the objective of the simulation effort. We only explain this so that the reader is aware of the possible detail of modeling communication between agents.

Excerpt 6 shows a communication example between members of the *VictoriaTeam* group. In this example the communication model is abstracted to a simple transfer of beliefs, without the complicated model of a communication tool used.

Excerpt 6. Communication Activity Example

```
communicate ComAct_NextRoverActivity(VictoriaTeam rcvr, int pri, int md) {
    priority: pri;
    max_duration: md;
    with: rcvr;
    about:
            send(VictoriaRover.nextActivity = anyvalue),
            send(VictoriaRover.subActivity = anyactivity),
            send(SATM.lengthIntoSurface = anyvalue),
            send(SATM.sampleVolume = anyvalue),
            send(VictoriaRover.gotoLocation = anylocation),
            send(VictoriaRover.drivingTime = anyvalue),
            send(rcvr.transmitCommand = true);
    when: end;
} //end activity

workframe wf_CommunicateDoDrillActivity {
    repeat: true;
    when (knownval(current.nextSubActivity = CommunicateDoDrillActivity))
    do {
            conclude((current.subActivity = CommunicateDoDrillActivity));
            conclude((VictoriaRover.nextActivity =
                    SearchForWaterIceInPermanentDarkAreaActivity));
            conclude((VictoriaRover.subActivity = DrillingActivity));
            //conclude((VictoriaRover.gotoLocation = ShadowAreaInCraterSN1));
            conclude((SATM.lengthIntoSurface = 10.0)); //drill 10cm deep
            conclude((SATM.sampleVolume = 1.0)); //take a 1.0 cc sample
            conclude((VehicleAndSpacecraftOpsTeam.transmitCommand = true));
            ComAct_NextRoverActivity(VehicleAndSpacecraftOpsTeam, 100, 10);
            conclude((current.nextSubActivity = WaitForDataActivity));
    } //end do
} //end workframe
```

By now the reader should be familiar enough with the Brahms language concepts of *workframe*, *preconditions, conclude* commands and *activity calls* that we will not explain this again. However, we will explain the new properties of the communication activity *ComAct_NextRoverActivity* in Excerpt 6. Every communication activity has a *with* property. This property declares with which agents or objects the communication is held. In the example, the value of the *with* property is the *rcvr* parameter. This parameter is of type *VictoriaTeam*, which means it can thus have one or more agents that are a member of *VictoriaTeam* as its bounded value. If we look in wfr

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wf_CommunicateDoDrillActivity we see that this parameter is bound to the agent *VehicleAndSpacecraftOpsTeam* (see the *ComAct_NextRoverActivity* activity call in the body of the workframe). In this example, the communication receiver is one agent that represents a whole team of people, which means the model is not concerned with the detail of individual agents and their use of communication tools.

The next important communication activity property is the *about* property. This property specifies the possible content of the communication. We specifically say 'possible content', because as mentioned an agent can only communicate those beliefs it actually has. Therefore, if during the execution of the *ComAct_NextRoverActivity* the performing agent does not have any of the beliefs that match the send transfer definition in the about property the belief–transfer cannot take place. An example of this is actually shown in the body of the wfr in Excerpt 6. Note that one of the conclude statements before the *ComAct_NextRoverActivity* call has been commented out (using the single line comment symbol '//'). This means that the agent will not get the belief about the *gotoLocation* attribute of the *VictoriaRover*. Thus, when in the communication activity the transfer definition for sending this belief to the receiver is executed, no belief-match is found and thus this belief-transfer will not take place.

The last important property for communication activities is the when property. This property can have two values, *start* or *end*. This property specifies when during the activity the beliefs are actually transferred. Imagine we want to model that the communication of a message takes some time, and we don't want the receiver to act on this communication until the end of the communication activity. In that case we would model this using an *end* value. On the other hand, if we want to model that the receiver acts on the message during the communication activity we would model this with a *start* value. At this moment it is not possible to specify other values for the when property, we can therefore not model the actual transfer of beliefs using some kind of timed distribution of actual transfer of beliefs during the activity. To model this we would have to represent this as a number of sequential communication activities, separating out the 'conversation'.

Geography Model

The last conceptual model that is part of a complete Brahms model is the geography model. The geography model consists of the definition of places (a.k.a. locations) where agents and objects can be placed. The first worldview in modeling work practice states that our actions take place in the world, so-called located or situated action. We thus include a model of the world in order to represent the fact that all our activities are located. A Brahms model that represents located behaviors must at least include those locations where modeled activity takes place. It should be noted that there is no rule that says that a Brahms model has to be about located behaviors, and it is thus perfectly fine to use Brahms to model more abstract behaviors and thus leave out the geography model. In Brahms we model places conceptually. This means that we do not model geography as a three-dimensional virtual reality model. Instead, we model the geography in terms of special type objects, called *areas,* representing a hierarchical organization of locations corresponding to locations in the modeled world. Figure 5 presents a partial geography of the Victoria model.

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Figure 5. Partial Geography Model of the Moon

Areas are instances of classes called *AreaDefinitions* (areadefs). Figure 5 shows the *MoonArea* areadef. As with any other type of object or class, areas and areadefs can have attributes and be hierarchically organized. Using the area attributes, agents can have beliefs about areas (e.g. the temperature in a Building area). The *MoonArea* areadef has six instances (i.e. area objects).

Location facts and beliefs

Each area can have a number of relationships associated with it: *partof*, *parts*, *paths* and *inhabitants*. As shown in Figure 5, the *ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1* has the following relationships. First off, this area is part of the *Moon* area. This means that the crater area is located on the Moon. The *partof* relation is important for the localization of agents and objects. That is, when an agent or object is located in an area (i.e. is an inhabitant), it is automatically also located in the area of which this area is part. For example, Figure 5 shows that the *VictoriaRover* agent is an inhabitant of area *ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1*. *ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1* is part of the *Moon* area, and thus the *VictoriaRover* is both located in the *ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1* area and in the *Moon* area.

Agent and object location has a special semantics in Brahms. When an agent or object is located in an area (i.e. is an inhabitant), a number of facts and beliefs are automatically kept track of by the simulation engine. First, localization is a fact in the world and the engine automatically generates a so-called *location* fact for each inhabitant. Thus, for the model in Figure 5 the engine generates the following fact: *(VictoriaRover.location = ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1)*. Second, every agent that is an inhabitant of an area receives the location facts of itself and all co-inhabitants of that area as beliefs. This means that the default is that every agent will know which other agents and objects are also located in its area. This engine behavior is dynamic, which means that if an agent moves from one area to another area the engine first retracts the current location fact, and asserts the new location fact. Next, the agents still located in the from-area have the location belief of the moved agent negated, so that they realize the agent has moved. The moved agent gets its new location as a new belief, thus overriding its old location belief. Next, all agents that are already inhabitants of the new location will receive the location of the newly arrived agent as beliefs. In short, agents and objects can only be in one location at a time, location of agents and objects are facts in the world, agents always know where they are and also always know which other objects and agents are in the same location.

Movement

As mentioned above, agents and objects can move between areas. There are two important notions about representing movement that need to be kept in mind, moving with a specific duration

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and moving along a defined path. Moving is an activity that takes time. There is a special activity type called a *move* activity. Excerpt 7 shows an example of a Rover agent's ability to execute the *TraverseToLocation* activity in a workframe. Moving is constraint, similar to any other activity, by the beliefs of the agent matching the precondition of a workframe calling a move activity.

Excerpt 7. Rover moving activity example

```
move TraverseToLocation(int pri, int md, MoonArea loc) {
    priority: pri;
    max_duration: md;
    location: loc;
} //end move

workframe wf_TraverseToLocationInShadowArea {
    repeat:true;
    variables:
            forone(MoonArea) loc;
            forone(int) drivingtime;
    when (knownval(current.gotoLocation = loc) and
            not(current.location = loc) and
            knownval(current.nextActivity = MoveToLocationActivity) and
            knownval(current.drivingTime = drivingtime) and
    do {
            conclude((RoverBattery.initialize = true));
            conclude((current.currentActivity = MoveToLocationActivity));
            TraverseToLocation(100, drivingtime, loc);
            CommunicateToEarthTeam(100);
    } //end do
} //end workframe
```

Excerpt 7 shows an example of movement with a specific duration. When the preconditions of the wfr *wf_TraverseToLocationInShadowArea* match the beliefs of the agent *VictoriaRover*, the rover calls the move activity *TraverseToLocation* with as parameters the duration of the move activity (i.e. the value of the variable *drivingtime*) and the location to which the rover needs to move (i.e. the value of the variable *loc*). In this example the rover moves from its current location to the *gotoLocation* in the given time *drivingtime* (as long as the rover is not already in the *gotoLocation*). This workframe represents the rover's generic capability to execute a command driving to a location with a certain speed (speed is modeled as an implicit calculation based on time and distance).

Another way of modeling movement duration of an agent or object is by pre-specifying the paths that can be taken from one location to another. *Paths* are objects that specify two end locations (i.e. *area* objects) and duration. Figure 5 shows that the geography model specifies that there exists a path *SAICSN1_to_from_SEICSN1* between the areas *SunlitAreaInCraterSN1* and *ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1*, and that the distance (specified in time) is a 100 simulation clock-ticks. With a clock grain-size of 1 second and a rover speed of 1 m/sec, the length of the path is 100 meters. Excerpt 8 shows the declaration of this path in source code.

Excerpt 8. Path declaration from Figure 5

```
path SAICSN1_to_from_SEICSN1 {
    area1: SunlitAreaInCraterSN1;
    area2: ShadowEdgeInCraterSN1;
    distance: 100; //100m, when rover speed in shadowed zones is 1 m/sec
}
```

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The use of *paths* in move activities goes as follows: when an agent or object performs a move activity without a duration and there is a *path* defined from the current location to the 'move to' location, the duration of the move is taken from the duration of the path. In case of multiple possible paths the engine calculates the shortest route and uses that as the duration of the move activity.

Discussion

After the detailed description of the Brahms language, its human behavior modeling capabilities and the workings of the simulation engine, we now turn to the use of Brahms as a modeling and simulation tool for the social simulation community.

The Brahms tool was originally developed to model work processes at the work practice level to include the 'social systems of work' in a simulation of work process in human organizations. Our research over the past decade has shown that, even discounting the difficulties of modeling human behavior with all the representational limitations, Brahms allows the detailed modeling of work practice at a level of detail that enables a) researchers to get insight into the way people actually work in an organization and b) system developers to use these models to develop computer software that, at a minimum, has a better representation of the user and its environment. In this paper we are trying to persuade researchers that the Brahms language is suitable for studying kinds of social phenomena of interest to the social simulation community. Our experience and results in modeling work practice makes us believe that larger social phenomena can also be modeled. The Brahms modeling language has great advantages for the researcher, because compared to existing tools, such as Swarm, the language allows for a more 'natural' representation of human behavior at the level of activities, reasoning, communication, interaction with objects and movement in the world (a level we might call the meso-level of human systems (Carley and Prietula 1994)). We believe that when the objective is to model human behavior at an individual agent level in order to analyze or predict social behavior at the macro system level, the best way to do this is to use a representational language that is geared towards representing human interaction that is based on theories of activity behavior of people.

We would argue that imperative programming languages that are suited to model macro-level system behavior using an agent design paradigm, are not flexible enough to claim a correspondence with actual human behavior, whereas cognitive architectures that are suited to model single agent cognitive behavior, based on a theory about how the brain actually stores and processes information, are too detailed to conveniently model human behavior at the level of agent interaction with other agents and the world (e.g. the simulation clock grain-size in both Soar and ACT-R is in the 100msec range). Brahms on the other hand, is a language that falls in between these two types of modeling languages. Brahms is a language that allows for an easy representation of agent behavior at the micro-level (i.e. reasoning behavior, without the brain correspondence claim) and meso-level (human interaction with each other and the world), allowing showing the effects of these behaviors at the macro-level (i.e. the process or system level).

Having said that, the question remains whether Brahms can be used to develop models that reproduce the results of previously developed models by social simulation researchers. Our intention is to do this in the future. We are convinced that this is possible. Researchers in the field of behavioral economics at the UC Berkeley School of Information Management Science have started to use Brahms and are beginning to apply Brahms to economics of information systems (Acquisti 2003).

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